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Making Up for Lost Time:
A Bright-Line Rule for Equitable Tolling in
Immigration Cases
INTRODUCTION
In March 2008, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a motion to reopen
an asylum case that had been filed sixteen days late.' The appellant, Yuan Gao,
claimed his delay was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Yuan Gao, who
feared that he would be persecuted for his religious faith if removed to China,
alleged that his immigration attorney had "misrepresented his intentions"
when she withdrew his asylum request and agreed to voluntary departure
during an immigration court hearing.2 After spending one month trying to
contact his original attorney, Yuan Gao hired a new lawyer.3 Invoking the
doctrine of equitable tolling, he asserted that the fruitless month he spent
attempting to contact his attorney should not have counted toward the ninety-
day filing deadline for motions to reopen.4 The Seventh Circuit rejected his
argument on the grounds that equitable tolling "does not reset the clock."'
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Yuan Gao v. Mukasey contributed to an
existing circuit split over the impact of equitable tolling on many
1. See Yuan Gao v. Mukasey, 519 F. 3 d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 20o8).
2. See Brief and Required Short Appendix of Petitioner at 5-9, Yuan Gao, 519 F. 3d 376 (No. o6-
4431); Brief for Respondent at 6-8, Yuan Gao, 519 F.3d 376 (No. o6-4431).
3. Brief and Required Short Appendix of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 9. According to the
petitioner's brief, Yuan Gao only realized the misrepresentation of his intentions after his
new counsel explained the hearing decision in Chinese. Id. Yuan Gao filed the motion "on
the lo6th day, which was the 75th or 7 6th day after the petitioner discovered that he had a
ground for filing a petition to reopen." Yuan Gao, 519 F.3d at 379.
4. See Brief and Required Short Appendix of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 22-24.
5. Yuan Gao, 519 F.3d at 378.
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nonjurisdictional filing deadlines. 6 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held
that the filing period should freeze during the equitable tolling period. 7 Under
this approach, Yuan Gao's clock would not have started running until Day 30,
when he retained new counsel, and he would have had ninety days from that
point forward to file his motion to reopen. The Seventh Circuit in Yuan Gao,
however, endorsed a "reasonableness" standard,8 which the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits have also applied in employment discrimination cases. 9 For those
courts, the movant must reasonably try to file the motion within the original
time window, even if he has an equitable tolling claim.
This Comment argues that courts should adopt the minority "frozen clock"
approach in the immigration context. The filing period for motions to reopen
and to reconsider should restart only after the immigrant regains the ability to
file such a motion."° Part I briefly overviews equitable tolling and explores why
courts have differed when forming equitable tolling standards. Part II discusses
how the Seventh Circuit in Yuan Gao erroneously analogized the asylum
context to the employment discrimination context when determining its
equitable tolling standard. Finally, Part III argues that the bright-line frozen
clock rule has several advantages: it reduces uncertainty about the time
window, promotes horizontal fairness across respondents, and ensures that
every petitioner has the benefit of a full filing period.
6. Jurisdictional deadlines, including those specifying the timing of judicial review, cannot be
equitably tolled. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995); Gerald L. Neuman, On the
Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2oo5, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 143
(2006). A statute of limitations, however, "provides an affirmative defense and is not
jurisdictional. Statutes of limitations may thus be waived or excused by rules, such as
equitable tolling, that alleviate hardship and unfairness." Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360,
2369 (2007) (citations omitted).
7. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F. 3d 1148 (lith Cir. 2005); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272
F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
8. See 519 F.3d 376.
9. Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F. 3d 493 (6th Cit. 2001); Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 58
F.3d 1323 (8th Cir. 1995).
1o. Both motions are filed with the immigration court unless the Board of Immigration Appeals
has jurisdiction because the appeal has been decided. See ROBERT C. DMNE, IMMIGRATION
PRACTICE § 11-7, at 11-97 (2008-2009 ed. 2008). "A motion to reopen presents new facts
bearing on the decision to remove the alien, while a motion to reconsider points to errors in
that decision." Johnson v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 403, 404 (7 th Cit. 2008). This Comment does
not discuss deadlines for appealing immigration decisions to the federal courts of appeals,
which cannot be tolled. See supra note 6. While this Comment focuses on motions to reopen
and to reconsider, the arguments presented can be applied to all nonjurisdictional deadlines
in the immigration context-including other filing and appeal deadlines that do not "govern
the transition from one court (or other tribunal) to another." Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 F. 3d 732,
734 (7th Cir. 2004).
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I. EQUITABLE TOLLING AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Filing deadlines govern a huge swath of civil claims, ranging from
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to habeas corpus
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)."
For these claims, plaintiffs must file within a prescribed time window, or risk
forfeiting their claims forever. Exceptions have been made when deadlines
would collide with the interests of justice. Courts created the doctrine of
equitable tolling by recognizing that a plaintiff should be granted "additional
time within which to sue (or meet some other deadline) if even diligent efforts
on his part would not have enabled him to prepare and file his suit within the
statutory period."" Statutes of limitations have been equitably tolled for a
variety of reasons, including fraud, 3 ineffective assistance of counsel, 4 and
mental incapacity.
The courts of appeals are split over when and how to apply equitable
tolling. Three main justifications have been offered in support of the
reasonableness standard, which inquires whether a respondent could
reasonably be expected to file within the original time window. First, fairness
dictates that the defendant should not be left in legal limbo past the filing
deadline. According to the Seventh Circuit, statutes of limitations "protect
important social interests in certainty, accuracy, and repose" and prevent
private employers from being exposed to an extended period of liability. 6
Second, equitable tolling "is an exception to the rule, and should therefore be
used only in exceptional circumstances. z17 Finally, the circuits have criticized
plaintiffs who wait months to file their claims and then try to invoke equitable
tolling.'
8
11. See, e.g., Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 4o8, 410 (2005) (AEDPA); Nat'l R.R Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (Title VII).
12. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2008).
13. See, e.g., Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3 d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
14. See, e.g., Cekic v. INS, 435 F. 3 d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2006); Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3 d 248,
251-52 & 252 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005).
15. See, e.g., Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F. 3d 1238, 1242 (9 th Cir. 1999).
16. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 199o).
17. Dring v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 58 F.3 d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995).
18. See Amini v. Oberlin Col., 259 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2001); Cada, 920 F.2d at 452; Dring,
58 F. 3 d at 1331.
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On the other side of the split, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
emphasized the plain meaning of tolling to endorse the bright-line approach.19
"Tolling means just what it says-the clock is stopped while tolling is in
effect."2 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit argues, the reasonableness standard
creates uncertainty because the parties cannot "calculate with some certainty"
the new filing deadline after tolling." Finally, application of the standard
interferes with legislative dictates. Congress meant for plaintiffs to enjoy the
full statute of limitations; courts should not decide that a truncated time
window was nevertheless a reasonable enough filing period."
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ANALOGY
The Seventh Circuit in Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. -an employment
discrimination case-expressed two major objections to the frozen clock
approach to equitable tolling: it is unfair toward private defendants and
rewards slothful plaintiffs. 3 Neither of those concerns, however, applies to
filing deadlines in the immigration context, which often involves foreign-born
respondents and highly legalistic proceedings. In Yuan Gao, the court applied
the Cada reasonableness standard for equitable tolling without explaining why
immigration cases should be subject to the same rule as employment
discrimination cases.'
A. The Fairness to Defendants Argument in Cada
The Cada court emphasized the importance of being fair to the defendant
when determining an equitable tolling standard. 5 In Cada, the defendant was a
private healthcare corporation. In the immigration context, however, the
opposing party is the federal government, and the fairness consideration is not
as strong. Unlike a private party, the government will not suffer lost profits or
ig. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3 d 1148, 1156 (i1th Cir. 2005); Socop-Gonzalez v.
INS, 272 F.3 d 1176, 1195 (9 th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
2o. Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 712 (1ith Cir. 2002).
21. Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3 d at 1195.
22. Id. at 1196.
23. 920 F.2d 446; see supra Part I and note 18.
24. Yuan Gao v. Mukasey, 519 F.3 d 376, 378 (7 th Cit. 2008). Furthermore, the court made no
attempt to distinguish the Ninth Circuit case Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F. 3 d 1176.
25. Cada, 920 F.2d at 453.
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accumulate back pay. The government can also rely on career attorneys rather
than hire outside counsel.26
Despite these differences, the federal government's substantial burdens in
handling immigration cases should not be understated. The huge backlog of
naturalization applications 7 and the heavy costs associated with a vigorous
policy of deporting undocumented individuals have been well chronicled.
8
The government arguably could face higher costs if strict filing deadlines were
altered under the frozen clock rule advocated in this Comment. Moreover, any
rule allowing the extension of filing dates could stymie congressional efforts to
streamline the deportation of undocumented immigrants. 9
Notwithstanding these burdens on the government, fairness considerations
still weigh in favor of the respondent noncitizens. Justice Blackmun, dissenting
in Ardestani v. INS, pointed out that "the stakes for the alien involved in
deportation proceedings -particularly in asylum cases-are enormous.""
Deportation may result "in loss of both property and life[,] or of all that makes
life worth living."3 In recent years, the government has erected significant
obstacles for respondents to challenge their removal proceedings. Federal laws
have restricted judicial review of removal orders, and additional regulations
have weakened the administrative appeals process.32 The reasonableness
a6. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal
Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 559-60 (2003) (pointing out that Congress created the
Department of Justice in part because employing government lawyers "would be less
expensive than relying on outside counsel").
27. See, e.g., Karin Brulliard, In D.C. Area, Citizenship Test Is One of Patience: Local Immigrants
Face Longest Wait, WASH. POST, May 3, 2008, at B1.
28. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, System of Neglect: As Tighter Immigration Policies
Strain Federal Agencies, The Detainees in Their Care Often Pay a Heavy Cost, WASH. POST, May
11, 2008, at Al.
29. Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
AEDPA, and the REAL ID Act of 2005 have restricted or, in some contexts, eliminated
judicial review of removal orders. See Eric M. Fink, Liars and Terrorists and Judges, Oh My:
Moral Panic and the Symbolic Politics of Appellate Review in Asylum Cases, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2019, 2023 (2008); Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution's Most
Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, lo6
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2006).
30. 502 U.S. 129, 147 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); see Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388,
391 (1947).
32. See David S. Udell & Rebekah Diller, Access to the Courts: An Essay for the Georgetown
University Law Center Conference on the Independence of the Courts, 95 GEO. L.J. 1127, 1149
(2007) ("[S]treamlining regulations adopted in August 2002 weakened the system of
internal administrative review of immigration judge decisions by the Board of Immigration
1249
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standard for equitable tolling could further erode the respondent's opportunity
to challenge an unfavorable ruling.
B. The Longer Filing Deadline in Cada
The Cada court had little sympathy for a complainant who waited almost
eight months to file his age discrimination claim. Yuan Gao, however, only had
a ninety-day deadline.33 Instead of recognizing the shorter timeframe for filing
motions to reopen immigration cases, the Yuan Gao court analogized to a
hypothetical case with a "1o-year statute of limitations for a suit on a written
contract" to illustrate how the frozen clock approach might leave the defendant
"on tenterhooks for 20 years. '34 The court's use of this hypothetical is puzzling
because the filing deadlines in Yuan Gao and Cada were not remotely close to
ten years in length. Freezing the clock may push some filing dates back weeks
or even months in immigration cases, but the government will never face ten-
year delays.
C. The Complexity of the Immigration Process
The Seventh Circuit's unexplained assumption that the same standard
should apply to both immigration and employment discrimination cases is
inappropriate because the two proceedings differ in several respects. Unlike
employment discrimination cases, asylum applications and removal
proceedings go through a complicated legal process. For example, a noncitizen
in removal proceedings must file his asylum application before an
administrative immigration judge, who determines the merits of the claim in a
later hearing.3" On the other hand, a noncitizen who is legally present in the
United States must file his asylum application before an asylum officer, who
Appeals (BIA), decreasing the BIA's size by over half, making disposition of appeals by a
single BIA member (rather than a panel of three) the norm, and encouraging the issuance of
opinions without analysis of the claims.").
33. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(C)(2) (2008) (governing motions before the Board of Immigration
Appeals); 8 C.F.R. 5 lOO 3 .23 (b)(1) (governing motions before the Immigration Court). For
certain removal orders, plaintiffs have 18o days to move to reopen. See 8 C.F.R.
§5 100 3.23(b)( 4)(i)-(ii). For motions to reconsider, the deadline is thirty days after the
mailing of the administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1o0 3 .2(b)(2) (governing motions before
the Board of Immigration Appeals); 8 C.F.R. § 1oo3.23(b)(1) (governing motions before the
Immigration Court).
34. 519 F.3d 376, 378-79 (7th Cir. 2008).
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may refer the claim to an immigration judge. 6 Noncitizens may appeal denials
of asylum applications to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court.37 They can also file motions to reopen and
reconsider with the immigration judge. The Supreme Court has noted,
An alien facing deportation generally is unfamiliar with the arcane
system of immigration law, is often unskilled in the English language,
and sometimes is uneducated; for these reasons, "deportation hearings
are difficult for aliens to fully comprehend, let alone conduct, and
individuals subject to such proceedings frequently require the
assistance of counsel.,3
Nonetheless, many respondents navigate this system pro se.39
In comparison, the procedure for preserving an employment discrimination
claim is simpler. The prospective plaintiff files a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),40 which takes on the
responsibility of conducting an investigation.4 The complainant can choose to
file a lawsuit at the end of the administrative process.42 In Cada, the Seventh
Circuit noted that "we are speaking not of a judicial complaint, but of an
36. See id. at 4o8-12.
37. See id. at 847-999.
38. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 146 (1991) (quoting Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020,
1026 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc)); see also Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 491 (7 th Cit.
2005) (affirming a motion to reopen filed almost nine months late in part because the
respondent "is a foreigner who may, therefore, have more than the average difficulty in
negotiating the shoals of American law").
39. See Larry R. Fleurantin, Immigration Law: Nowhere To Turn -Illegal Aliens Cannot Use the
Freedom of Information Act as a Discovery Tool To Fight Unfair Removal Hearings, 16 CARDozo
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 155, 158 (2008) ("Between 20O1 and 2005, over 50% of immigrants
appeared pro se in removal proceedings within the nation's 54 Immigration Courts.
According to the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, in 2003, nearly 40% of immigrants
who hired attorneys prevailed on the merits of their cases as compared to only 14% of the
pro se immigrants.").
40. The EEOC's enforcement mechanisms and filing deadlines differ in some respects
depending on which statute was allegedly violated, but the charge-filing process is similar.
See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1153 (2008); EEOC, Filing a Charge of
Employment Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview-Charge-filing.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
41. See Jamie Goetz, Comment, Whose Opinion Really Matters? Admitting EEOC Reasonable
Cause Determinations as Evidence of Discrimination, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 995, 996-98 (2008).
42. Id. at 998.
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administrative complaint. ,43  The written charge has few content
requirements, 44 and "even if a charge fails to contain the specified information,
it may still be sufficient, provided it is 'a written statement sufficiently precise
to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices
complained of."' 4 The Yuan Gao court also argued that the motion to reopen
itself is not difficult to compose; 46  nevertheless, the motion must be
understood in the wider context of a complex legal regime populated by pro se
immigrants.47
III.IN SUPPORT OF A BRIGHT-LINE "FROZEN CLOCK" RULE
The bright-line rule advocated in this Comment is grounded in the simple
premise that every respondent in an immigration proceeding deserves the full
statutory filing period to assert his claims. The reasonableness standard
introduces additional ambiguity and subjectivity into the process by allowing
the effective filing period to vary with each appellate panel. This uncertainty
may adversely impact the respondent in immigration cases by exerting
additional pressure and hindering his ability to retain adequate legal
representation.
Equitable tolling applies in situations where the blameless respondent
applies his best efforts but still cannot meet the filing deadline. For Yuan Gao,
whose first month was allegedly lost, the filing window was effectively sixty
days. Under the reasonableness standard, a judge was required to decide
whether the remaining two months provided Yuan Gao sufficient time to file
his motion to reopen. Horizontal fairness across respondents under this system
is impossible: the effective time window for each respondent varies depending
on the judicial panel. A frozen clock rule would ensure that respondents always
receive the full filing time. In the case of motions to reopen, each respondent
43- 92o F.2d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 199o).
44. See 29 C.F.R. § 16o.6-.9, 1626.6-.8 (20o8); Goetz, supra note 41, at 996-97; see also Cada,
92o F.2d at 452 ("Cada could have prepared an adequate administrative complaint within
days.").
45. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 5o2 F.3d 1176, 1184 (loth Cir. 2007) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 16o1.12(b) (2007)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(b) (2008) (stating the requirement for age
discrimination).
46. 519 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2008).
47. See Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 7-10 (2008).
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would be guaranteed an effective ninety days, ensuring uniformity across
cases48 and minimizing judicial discretion.
Some uncertainty will inherently exist in these situations because the judge
ultimately decides whether the deadline was tolled and for how long. But this
subjective determination is unavoidable. Under the reasonableness standard,
judges acquire an estimate of how long the respondent could not file for
reasons beyond his control and then weigh the adequacy of the remaining time.
The bright-line rule eliminates this second step and keeps uncertainty to a
minimum. Rather than trying to determine how much time is "reasonable,"
judges would just add on the balance of the filing period. This rule conforms to
the Supreme Court's understanding of equitable tolling: "Principles of
equitable tolling usually dictate that when a time bar has been suspended and
then begins to run again upon a later event, the time remaining on the clock is
calculated by subtracting from the full limitations period whatever time ran
before the clock was stopped."49
The uncertainty of the Cada standard could also hurt respondents in their
search for adequate counsel. Whenever a respondent hires a new attorney after
part of the filing deadline has elapsed, the lawyer cannot be certain whether to
rush to meet the original deadline. Is one month a "reasonable" amount of
time? Or two months? In a case involving an untimely Federal Employers'
Liability Act claim, the Supreme Court pointed out that to "toll the federal
statute for a 'reasonable time' ... would create uncertainty as to exactly when
the limitation period again begins to run.""0 The reasonableness standard
"promotes inconsistency of application and uncertainty of calculation.""s Busy
attorneys juggling many clients might be reluctant to take cases midstream
because they might not have the full time period to file. 2
Importantly, the bright-line rule is a modest one. The window would still
be ninety effective days to file a motion to reopen. The equitable tolling doctrine
48. See Yuan Gao, 519 F.3d at 378.
49. United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1991). While the plain meaning of the above
definition endorses the bright-line rule, the Court cited Cada in the same footnote. Later
Court decisions have also cited Cada, usually for its discussion of the various tolling
doctrines. See, e.g., John R. Sand.& Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753 (20o8);
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 192 (1997).
5o. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 435 (1965).
51. Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
52. The Seventh Circuit suggested that Yuan Gao's lawyer could have asked for an extension,
but the court went on to recognize that "it is unclear whether the immigration judge could
have given him one; and, if not, his only recourse may indeed have been to plead equitable
tolling." Yuan Gao, 519 F.3d at 378.
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is also self-regulating because it is only available to respondents who cannot
meet the filing deadline "despite all due diligence." 3 Charlatans and sloths
whose motive is delay cannot hide behind the doctrine. Furthermore, certain
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act ensure that the frozen clock
approach would not undermine legitimate immigration enforcement efforts.
First, the law limits respondents to one motion to reconsider and one motion
to reopen.14 Second, filing a motion to reopen generally does not stay the
execution of an immigration judge's final order, including an order of
removal."s While the rule might lead to an increase in the total number of
timely filed motions, there is no reason to believe that these additional motions
will be frivolous. Since the harm to the government is minimal, s6 the cost-
benefit analysis weighs in favor of the bright-line rule even if it only captures a
few additional meritorious motions.5 7
CONCLUSION
In Yuan Gao, the Seventh Circuit transplanted the reasonableness standard
for equitable tolling into the immigration context, even though Cada's
concerns from the employment discrimination context were not present in the
immigration context. The frozen clock approach to equitable tolling better
serves the important interests of immigration respondents. This bright-line
rule would enhance certainty about due dates, impose low costs on the
government, and provide respondents the benefit of the full filing period.
Respondents deserve no less considering the high stakes involved in
immigration cases.
DAVID ZHOU
53. Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3 d at 1193; Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7 th
Cir. 199o). This requirement would prevent excessively long tolling periods- respondents
will have a difficult time proving constant "due diligence" in the many months or years after
the expiration of a deadline.
54. See 8 U.S.C. S 1229a(c)(6)(A)-(7)(A) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 100 3 .23 (b)(1) (2008).
55. See 8 C.F.R. 55 100 3 .2(f), 1003.23(b)(1)(v).
56. See supra Section II.A.
s7. The analysis here is similar to the three-pronged test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The arguments outlined in this Comment may
support the extension of the bright-line rule into other contexts beyond immigration when
the same values are at stake.
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